In Search of Psychology's Philosophical Center

Abstract

Howard Gardner (1994) observed that “nearly every field begins as philosophy; and psychology continues to foreground its philosophical origins more faithfully than any other discipline” (p. 182). By foreground, no doubt Gardner meant that psychology readily acknowledges and recognizes the prominent role that philosophy played in its creation and development. Philosophy is the parent of psychology. And what a child philosophy begat. Just the other day, my students and I were discussing how amazing it is that an academic discipline of such a tender age should account for the greatest number of academic majors in most universities. Psychology departments are infested with eager suitors, most of whom are unlikely ever to take a philosophy course as part of their program. They are also unlikely to be made aware of philosophy’s role in the creation of their discipline. Even in most History of Psychology classes, the philosophical roots are likely dealt with early on and with alacrity so that ample time can be made for the rise of psychodynamic and behaviorist theories, the challenge of the Third Force, and the recent onslaught of the cognitive revolution. I do not find it surprising at all that, after tracing the genesis of educational psychology as outlined in the discipline’s texts, Murphy’s (2003) students came to the common understanding that the discipline was born out of behaviorism. I would be shocked if they had not come to that conclusion. This divorce between philosophy and psychology (these days one can divorce one’s parent) seems to me to be afflicting not only the preparation of our future scholars but also the professional conversation among the field’s practitioners. Philosophically oriented discussions in and about educational psychology research or theory are largely absent from our major and mainstream journals. Even at conferences, philosophical discourse seems very much the exception and rather prominently absent from the vast number of symposia, paper sessions, posters, and roundtables. Psychology, and in this issue we are concerned with educational psychology, may readily acknowledge and recognize its parentage, but in most universities, the child has long left home and seldom calls her mother. How appropriate that Alexander (2003), who suggested in her Division 15 presidential address that psychology had lost touch with its roots, should entitle her wonderful introduction to this issue, “Coming Home.” When psychological research and theory fail to be undergirded by philosophical understandings, the costs can be high. Philosophical understandings form the paradigmatic world views and foundational tenets that are at the very core of psychological formulating and theorizing. Such understandings form the beliefs and the set of agreements shared by researchers and theorists regarding how the problems within their discipline are to be understood and solved, as well as the methodological practices that will be undertaken to solve them (Kuhn, 1970). Without such foundational understandings, the process of deriving meaning becomes a frustrating enterprise, often serving to distort the very meaning sought. Philosophical understandings form our very vision of reality. Scientific disciplines that distance themselves from their philosophical underpinnings do so at their peril. Kulikowich and DeFranco (2003) are eloquent in describing the tension between our focus on “fallible experience” versus “absolute truth,” and they show how educational psychology can be informed by the types of debates that have led to the development of the science of mathematics. Woods (2003) seeks the “particular go” of truth in educational research and practice and like Murphy (2003) frames this particular go within the promulgation of pragmatic thought and practice of Peirce and Royce. Rosiek (2003) calls for a more methodologically diverse educational psychology grounded in a qualitative experimentalism inspired by Dewey’s educational philosophy. What each author has in common is the call for a renewed conversation between philosophy and psychology, a conversation aimed at resolving what Bruner (1996) suggested has minimized the perceived relevance of psychological theorizing, promulgating, and professing. At the heart of the matter is their concern that, without such a dialogue, educational psychologists face the difficult task of convincing their constituencies that their theories, constructs, and research findings are both meaningful and relevant. EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, 38(3), 177–181 Copyright © 2003, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.