Abstract
T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism and more specifically his conception of morality narrowly conceived proscribe direct appeal to what he calls impersonal values, such as items of natural beauty or cultural goods. In the scope of what we owe to each other, one should appeal only to concerns arising from what bears directly on individuals, by reference to which they can reasonably reject one set of principles in favour of another. There is an overlooked ambiguity here in how we should understand the scope of “what we owe to each other.” Unpacking this helps us see more clearly how contractualism can respond to the challenge that it must accommodate the intuitive force of aggregating: that, when all other things are equal, we are required to save a greater number of people over a lesser. I explain the role personal and impersonal value have in Scanlon’s contractualism. I connect the focus on personal value with perspectivalism, the justificatory privileging of the perspective of victims. Perspectivalism, I suggest, is motivated by Scanlon’s constructivist methodology. Whether perspectivalism is adequate as the basis of contractualism is not independent of the question of aggregation. Given the ambiguity highlighted, I conclude that other forms of contractualism might safely ignore the demands of aggregation.
Highlights
Suppose I propose that we should build a high-tech industrial park right on the slopes of Mount Snowdon, an opportunity for greater profits given the proximity of the sea; or suppose we consider whether the British Museum should be remodelled as a luxury hotel, well-situated for Continental financiers on their way to the City from St
You might object that the vulgar plan misses the significant value that resides in the object under threat: in the one case, that of natural beauty; in the other, that of great cultural worth
It may seem fairly straightforward to conclude that it is the value that resides in the Welsh countryside itself, and the value in the institution of the British Museum that is the ground of such a complaint
Summary
This second concern is still placed by Scanlon in the realm of personal reasons, precisely because it has to do with the status of individuals within a pattern of justification: In discussing fairness ... We could seek to locate Scanlon’s defence of aggregative intuitions not at the level of personal reasons, all of which seem to balance in the relevant cases, but in some suitable structural concern that would explain why it would not be reasonable to permit a policy of saving the lesser number.
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