Abstract

It is widely acknowledged that Korea will not be secure against future economic crisis without structural reform of finance, enterprise and labor markets. Real reform requires a transfer of authority from the government to market-based institutions, forcing banks to take full responsibility for the loans they authorize. Before the crisis, the government implicitly insured depositors' bank loans made to the large conglomerates, leaving banks little incentive to develop the necessary skills in credit analysis and loan monitoring. The insured agents did not take proper care to manage their risks. Moral hazard or will increased government control over the financial sector weaken market discipline?

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.