IN DEFENSE OF THE EAST ASIAN REGIONAL ORDER: EXPLAINING JAPAN’S NEWFOUND INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Abstract

IntroductionIn his first press conference for the current year conducted on January 5, pursue a contribution international peace.1 The phrase has been used numerous times by Prime Minister Abe characterize his government's strategic vision and narrative of the for Japan, including in the country's Security Strategy,2 Defence Program Guidelines3 and in almost every major foreign policy speech delivered by the prime minister and his foreign and defense ministers. One such recent occasion was the prime minister's keynote address the Shangri La Dialogue in May 2014.4That make a proactive contribution peace is linked Abe's insistence that Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country.5 The desire for play such a role was offered in large part as the justification for the formation of a National Security Council coordinate strategic, foreign and defense policy under the Prime Minister's direction, for increasing Japanese defense spending in 2013 (which was the first increase for eleven years even if the rise was a modest one of 0.8 per cent,) and for relaxing its self-imposed arms export ban for the first time by revising the country's longstanding Three Principles on Arms Exports - guidelines which had been left in place for over fifty years. Tellingly, seeking play a more role is at the heart of Abe's reinterpretation of the country's pacifist constitution allow contributions collective security (i.e., coming the aid of allies) under a number of scenarios. Indeed, and at the time of writing this article, legislation allowing a broadening of Japan's along these lines is being debated in the country's Diet.The (re)emergence of a can-do and will-do under Abe is also of high interest Southeast - key strategic players such as Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia - but also the region as a whole. Telling an audience in Jakarta of the strategic significance of Southeast due the region's geographical position between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Abe promised that would shift its attention southward rather than only focus more narrowly on its immediate environs as it has done for decades after the Second World War. Abe also reaffirmed the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance in maintaining in Southeast (and not just Northeast Asia,) while the prime minister would make genuine efforts strengthen ties with maritime Asia and also with ASEAN.6 When one considers that Abe took the highly symbolic decision visit all ten ASEAN nations during his first year in office of his second coming as prime minister (a first for any non-ASEAN leader,) it is clear that Tokyo's contemporary strategic interest in Southeast under Abe is both genuine and meaningful.Less clear is Tokyo's strategic motivation, giving rise some alarmist sentiment in the region. Japan's conception of an expanded strategic for itself in East Asia, including in Southeast Asia, has led some capitals (namely Beijing and Seoul) and commentaries chiding Tokyo for a shift to the right and returning a militaristic past which might even threaten peace and stability in the region.7 One survey of South Koreans - a country with still raw memories of its troubled history with - even found that sixty-two per cent of respondents perceived Abe's be a military threat.8 Such sentiments tend be based on crude slippery slope projections of an ever expanding Japanese strategic and presence including in Southeast Asia. Little consideration is given what is actually doing in the region and why; and importantly what enduring limitations remain for when it comes Tokyo playing an extended in Southeast in particular.The paper is designed answer these above contentions. It begins by looking at the pillars of the liberal order that emerged after the Second World War, and why China's rise potentially presents a fundamental challenge such an order. …