Abstract
ABSTRACTI recently argued that critical realists ought to adopt transcendental idealism in favour of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. In response, Dustin McWherter presents two arguments against transcendental idealism: (1) it is inferior to transcendental realism because it cannot account for the epistemic significance of experimentation, and (2) it is internally inconsistent because it affirms the existence of things-in-themselves. This brief reply defends transcendental idealism against both objections.
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