Abstract
Engel defends the normative interpretation of the aim of belief against the main criticisms and alternatives. According to this interpretation, belief aims at truth because truth is the most fundamental norm of belief, and is constitutive of the concept of belief. He replies to the objections that it is impossible to apply, and that it fails to regulate belief (Sections 2 and 3). In Section 4 he confronts the normative account with the view that the notion of an aim of belief is to be interpreted literally as a teleological goal. In Section 5, he argues that the normative account offers a better analysis of the regulation of belief. Finally he considers (Section 6) the relationship between the norm of truth and the norm of knowledge.
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