Abstract
In The Problem of Pain, C.S. Lewis offers a multi-pronged Christian explanation for the suffering in the world. Lewis first develops a free will theodicy, according to which much of the suffering in our world is a by-product of human free will. To account for the remaining suffering (caused by, for instance, disease and natural disasters), Lewis develops a version of the soul-making theodicy, according to which some of the suffering in the world is permitted by God as part of a divine project of improving the moral character of human beings. Nicholas Wolterstorff has recently raised some interesting challenges for Lewis's soul-making theodicy. In this essay I respond to Wolterstorff's critique by drawing not only on Lewis's broader corpus beyond The Problem of Pain but also, to a lesser extent, on the thought of two other contemporary proponents of the soul-making theodicy, John Hick and Trent Dougherty. My main goal is to make the case that Lewis's version of the soul-making theodicy has more depth and resilience than Wolterstorff's critique suggests.
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