In behalf of ?in behalf of the fool?

Abstract

Gaunilo's reply to Anselm's argument for the existence of God was a similar argument for the existence of the lost island, 'more excellent than all other countries' ([2] :1 1). Ansehn's God has done fairly well since that time; He has walked with Bonaventure and Descartes, with Leibniz and with Barth. Noteworthy among recent and not-quite-so-recent defenders of Anselm's argument are Alvin Plantinga ([8], [9]) and Charles Hartshorne ([5]). Gaunilo's island has not done so well; both Plantinga and Hartshorne reject the parody in no uncertain terms, and Hartshorne goes so far as to nominate Gaunilo as 'the most overrated thinker in history' ([5] :1 13). Anselm's presentation of the argument is couched in terms of 'greatness' and 'existence in the imagination', and the crucial premise which even the fool must grant is that God exists in the imagination. Gaunilo's parody rests on the similar premise that the lost island exists in the imagination. But Anselm's argument has not escaped attempts at improvement; Hartshorne replaces 'greatness' with 'perfection', Plantinga uses 'maximal greatness' and 'maximal excellence' defined in terms of omniscience, onmipotence, moral perfection and possible worlds, and both replace Anselm's 'existence in the imagination' with possible existence. 1 Thus in contemporary forlns of the argument the crucial premise is that it is possible that God exists (or possible that 'maximal greatness' is instantiated), and a similarly updated form of Gaunilo's parody would rely on the premise that it is possible that the lost island (suitably specified) exists. Hartshorne and Plantinga both use the strategy of denying the crucial premise of Gaunilo's parody while defending its analogue in the ontological argument; it is not possible that such an island exists, though it is possible that God does, or that maximal greatness is instantiated. Their reasons for apparent unanimity on this point, however, are different enough to call for individual scrutiny. In what follows I hope to show that both Hartshorne's and Plantinga's replies to Gaunilo are inadequate, and that contemporary forms of the ontological argument are as open to parody in the manner of Gaunilo as was Anselm's original. I will also say a few things about what it is that succesful parody really shows.