Abstract
We synthesize the main findings from two studies that examined moral judgement abilities in people with autism, and in people with Down syndrome. In both studies, the way these people mentally combine information about the intent of a harmful act and the severity of its consequences when attributing blame to an offender was compared with that of typically developing controls. Adolescents and adults with autism or with Down syndrome were, practically to the same extent as controls, able to take into account both information pieces for attributing blame. It would be an exaggeration to imply that adolescents and adults with either autism or Down syndrome are severely immature in moral judgement based on the fact that they are usually not able to explain or justify their judgements with sophisticated philosophical arguments. By contrast, children with autism blame attribution appeared to be essentially based on consequence information. The finding that adolescents and adults with autism or Down syndrome are able to make moral judgements in a way that is not very different from adolescents and adults of the same age could influence the way these people are perceived, cared for, and attributed basic rights.
Highlights
RESUMEN Sintetizamos las principales conclusiones de dos estudios que examinaron la capacidad de juicio moral en personas con autismo y en personas con síndrome de Down
In the present chapter we present the main findings from two studies that used the methodological framework created by Surber (1977) to examine moral judgement abilities in people with Down syndrome (Morales et al, 2015), and in people with autism (Rogé & Mullet, 2011)
Adolescents and adults with autism or with Down syndrome were, practically to the same extent as controls, able to take into account intent and consequence information for attributing blame
Summary
Since the beginning of empirical developmental psychology (Piaget, 1932), the development, from childhood to adulthood, of moral reasoning and moral judgement has been examined. Moral reasoning is conceived as an explicit and relatively slow process that corresponds to Kahneman’s (2011) System 2 Researchers involved in this field of study usually consider the person as a lay moral philosopher. In the present chapter we present the main findings from two studies that used the methodological framework created by Surber (1977) to examine moral judgement abilities in people with Down syndrome (Morales et al, 2015), and in people with autism (Rogé & Mullet, 2011) In both studies, the way people with developmental disability mentally combine information about the intent of a harmful act and. The severity of its consequences when attributing blame to the offender and that of typically developing controls were compared
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