Improving urban resilience against climate change through government tax policies to housing companies: A game-theoretic approach

Abstract

Mass housing companies play a vital role in improving the resilience of urban infrastructure against disasters. Equipping residential settlements against disasters caused by climate change increases the safety of urban infrastructure against these disasters. However, the continuation of these measures requires government support due to their high cost. The present study establishes a three-stage stackelberg game model and examines the role of government tax policies in increasing the resilience of residential settlements. This model consists of the government, mass housing companies, and whole building buyers. The decisions of the players and their utility are obtained in equilibrium conditions. Then, the model's efficiency is examined by presenting the city of Karaj as a case study. Also, through sensitivity analysis, the effect of different parameters on the interests of the government and companies is investigated, and various managerial insights are suggested for urban management. Based on the results obtained, urban management can simultaneously improve the economic situation, urban infrastructure resilience, and resilient mass housing companies by providing a tax exemption policy within a specific range.