Improving the benefits of wildlife harvesting in Northern Cameroon: a co-management perspective

Abstract

We examined ways of improving the incentive structure of a safari company, the state, and the local communities within a wildlife co-management framework in Northern Cameroon. To this end, we built an integer linear programming model with state-allocated quotas and a profit maximisation objective function for a typical hunting concession. The model was evaluated under three scenarios representing varying taxation schemes and apportionment of trophy fees and company's profits. Further, we set forth three principles that should underlie a good incentive structure, namely (i) a close link to the resource base, (ii) economic sustainability, and (iii) a transfer of land property rights from the state to the communities neighbouring the hunting areas. Our results indicate that the safari company would improve its profits if the concession term is extended to 15 years and a single business tax is substituted to the current myriad of levies. The local communities should be apportioned 25% of the trophy fees and a negotiated percentage of the company's profit, in return for resource custodianship. Finally, the state could expect an increased efficiency of its conservation policy through an improved regulatory framework and a more equitable distribution of wildlife revenues.