Abstract
Privacy and security are very important in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). VANETs are negatively affected by any malicious user’s behaviors, such as bogus information and replay attacks on the disseminated messages. Among various security threats, privacy preservation is one of the new challenges of protecting users’ private information. Existing authentication protocols to secure VANETs raise challenges, such as certificate distribution and reduction of the strong reliance on tamper-proof devices. In 2011, Yeh et al. proposed a PAACP: a portable privacy-preserving authentication and access control protocol in vehicular ad hoc networks. However, PAACP in the authorization phase is breakable and cannot maintain privacy in VANETs. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis of an attachable blind signature and demonstrate that the PAACP’s authorized credential (AC) is not secure and private, even if the AC is secretly stored in a tamper-proof device. An eavesdropper can construct an AC from an intercepted blind document. Any eavesdropper can determine who has which access privileges to access which service. For this reason, this paper copes with these challenges and proposes an efficient scheme. We conclude that an improving authentication scheme and access control protocol for VANETs not only resolves the problems that have appeared, but also is more secure and efficient.
Highlights
vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are a special case of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) that aim to enhance the safety and efficiency of road traffic [1,2,3,4]
Wu et al [15] presented a cryptanalysis of an attachable blind signature and demonstrate that the PAACP’s authorized credential (AC) is not secure and private, even if the AC is secretly stored in a tamper-proof device
Wu et al [15] proposed a cryptanalysis of an attachable blind signature and demonstrated that the PAACP’s authorized credential (AC) is not secure and private, even if the AC is secretly stored in a tamper-proof device
Summary
VANETs are a special case of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) that aim to enhance the safety and efficiency of road traffic [1,2,3,4]. In 2005, Raya et al [7] first proposed a solution that mentioned both the security and privacy issues of safety-related applications. Designing a practical non-safety application for VANETs should take the following requirements into consideration [13,14]: Mutual authentication: providing mutual authentication between the two communicating parties, such as a vehicle-to-roadside communication device. In the authorization phase, a PAACP is breakable and cannot maintain privacy in VANETs. Recently, Wu et al [15] presented a cryptanalysis of an attachable blind signature and demonstrate that the PAACP’s authorized credential (AC) is not secure and private, even if the AC is secretly stored in a tamper-proof device.
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