Improving Physical Layer Security of Ground Stations Against GEO Satellite Spoofing Attacks

Abstract

The integration of satellite and terrestrial communication systems has the potential to revolutionize worldwide services, enabling ubiquitous and dependable coverage. However, these systems’ unique complexity and design also present opportunities for cyber attacks. The “new space revolution” makes it possible to launch many commercial satellites at a meager cost equipped with smart phased array beam having electronic steering capabilities. The wide spread use of space technologies creates opportunities for cyber attackers to hijack satellites and direct their beams toward specific geographic areas, posing a threat to ground stations and other terrestrial networks. To counter this problem, we propose a cutting-edge signal processing algorithm that can authenticate signals transmitted by satellites to ground stations. Our innovative algorithm can differentiate between signals originating from different satellites by leveraging the spatio-temporal imprint on the signal as it travels through different atmospheric paths in the channel. Simulation studies show that the algorithm achieves a remarkable authentication rate of more than $$95\%$$ for signals received by a ground station located in Beer Sheva, Israel, based on a control experiment involving two different GEO satellites, AMOS-17 and AsiaSat-7. By enhancing physical layer security, our algorithm can protect satellite and terrestrial communication systems against cyber-attacks, ensuring reliable and secure global communication services.