Abstract
Even though the Kuwait Crisis convinced the British Government that Britain’s special position in the Persian Gulf remained a necessity, it was acknowledged at the same time in the Foreign Office that maintaining this presence came at a certain price. There was no alternative to the combination of a military presence in the Gulf with the exercise of political influence on the local regimes if Britain’s significant economic and political interests in the area were to be protected. On the other hand, this policy also had certain negative impacts for the British Government. Its main disadvantage was the strain it placed on Britain’s relationship with other Arab countries, most importantly the UAR. In the aftermath of the Kuwait Crisis, Luce warned the Foreign Office of the adverse effects of Britain’s continued presence in the area.1
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