Abstract

As an all-important cryptographical technique, proxy re-signature (PRS) is broadly applied to distributed computation, copyright transfer and hidden path transfer because it permits a proxy to translate an entity’s signature into another entity’s signature on the identical message. Most existing PRS schemes make use of time-consuming pairing computation. Recently, to discard time-consuming pairing operator and complicated certificate-management, Wang et al. proposed two efficient pairing-free ID-based PRS schemes, and declared that their schemes were provably secure in the ROM. Very unluckily, in this investigation, we point out that Wang et al.’s schemes suffer from attacks of universal forgery by analyzing their security, i.e., any one can fabricate a signature on arbitrary data. After the relevant attacks are shown, the reasons which result in such attacks are analyzed. Finally, to address the above-mentioned attacks, we put forward an improved ID-based PRS scheme. The improved scheme not only preserves all advantages of Wang et al.’s scheme, but also is demonstrated to be provably secure in the ROM. Compared with the other two ID-PRS schemes, our improved ID-PRS scheme offers more advantages in respect of the overall performance and security.

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