Abstract
The eavesdropping scheme proposed by Wójcik [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90 (2003) 157901] on the ping-pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89 (2002) 187902] is improved by constituting a new set of attack operations. The improved scheme has a zero eavesdropping-induced channel loss and produces perfect anticorrelation. Therefore, the eavesdropper Eve can safely attack all the transmitted bits and the eavesdropping information gain can always exceed the legitimate user's information gain in the whole domain of the quantum channel transmission efficiency η, i.e., [ 0 , 100 % ] . This means that the ping-pong protocol can be completely eavesdropped in its original version. But the improvement of the ping-pong protocol security produced by Wójcik is also suitable for our eavesdropping attack.
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