Abstract
We examine the effects of Chinese import penetration on executive compensation of US firms. We find that import penetration reduces executives’ total compensation, stock grants, wealth-performance sensitivity, and opportunistic grant timing, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms. Furthermore, we find that import penetration increases option grants and option duration, thus incentivizing more innovation and risk-taking.
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