Abstract
This paper exploits recent work on the normative and constitutive roles of knowledge in practical rationality, to put pressure on the idea that speakers could communicate without exploiting linguistic knowledge. I defend cognitivism about meaning, the view that speakers have rationally accessible (i.e., implicit rather than tacit) knowledge of semantic facts and principles, and that this knowledge is constitutive of their linguistic competence.
Highlights
This paper aims to bring recent work in epistemology to bear on a longstanding debate concerning the role of knowledge of language in an ordinary speaker's linguistic competence
My defence of cognitivism in this paper aims at showing, on the contrary, that as speakers we do have semantic knowledge, we ordinarily do and must make use of it in communication: Semantic knowledge is constitutive of linguistic competence
Though differing in other important respects,16 these positions agree in the central anti-cognitivist contention that even if speakers possess some knowledge of language—for example, knowledge of what sentences mean—this knowledge plays no role in securing successful linguistic communication (Hornsby 2005, p. 128; cf., p. 8; Schiffer 1987, p. 262)
Summary
This paper aims to bring recent work in epistemology to bear on a longstanding debate concerning the role of (largely implicit) knowledge of language in an ordinary speaker's linguistic competence.
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