Implications of Terminal Logic Behavior and the Logic of Strategic Defection during Presidential Transitions for Sustainability of Food and Nutrition Security Policy

Abstract

Presidential transitions have been described as times of uncertainty and contradiction in which normal relationships among power, accountability, and electoral support that characterize a normal democratic process do not hold. When presidents have no possibility of reelection, they typically overvalue far‐future rewards and succumb to terminal logic behavior (TLB), i.e., end‐of‐tenure presidential behavior that responds mainly to concerns about legacy despite of political context. Government appointed authorities that perceive insecurity at the end of the term tend to behave under the logic of strategic defection (SD), i.e., governmental officials experiencing institutional insecurity during transitions face motives to dissociate themselves from the outgoing government once it losses power. We theorized that in countries where presidential reelection is impossible and political parties are perceived as inconstant governmental officials show TLB and SD. TLB and SD likely influence short‐term decision‐making that determines institutional and political behavior‐patterns during transitions, and may further affect those related to FNSP that are valid after transitions, i.e. definition of priorities, appointment of officials, reallocation of resources, and timing of implementation continuity. TLB and SD could potentially prevent FNSP from being operationalized according to the initial strategic plans. We examined the role of TLB and SD for the sustainability of food and nutrition security policies (FNSP) during presidential transitions in a Central American country.A constructivist grounded‐theory approach was used for a qualitative case study. Purposeful criterion and snowball sampling techniques were used to recruit 52 policy actors at national and municipal levels for semi‐structured interviews. Data were analyzed using grounded‐theory coding techniques, and triangulated using news articles, public speeches, and policy documents.Policy actors reported governmental TLB and SD that were relevant to sustainability of FNSP at the national and municipal levels. Consequences of TLB and SD included slow down or cessation of implementation, dysfunctional collaboration, inefficient use of resources, benefits not reaching targeted groups, and loss of momentum affecting policy continuity by upcoming officials. These consequences occurred through individual, institutional, and political mechanisms.Understanding the extent to which TLB and SD occur at all governmental levels and affect sustainability is advantageous to being able to develop compensatory approaches during early stages of a presidential term. Foreseeing and positively influencing and responding to TLB and SD during presidential transitions are unexplored opportunities for reaching the long‐term goals of FNSP.Support or Funding InformationDepartment of Health Promotion, Education, and Behavior. Arnold School of Public Health, University of South Carolina