Abstract
This article uses a theory of intra-party factionalism to explain the partial successes in implementing the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement (hereafter, Agreement) and to explain why stalling has remained the overwhelming characteristic of the process. The theory presents obstacles to implementation as stemming from intra-party conflict between factions adopting strategies that are supportive of, sceptical of or against implementation. It argues that the design of the implementation process-the rules and procedures for sequencing and timing implementation-is critical to overcoming the obstacles presented by intra-group factionalism and to determining the successes and failures of implementation. Where rules and procedures allow for the parallel sequencing and the breakdown of all issues, the strategies of spoiler factions are undermined and implementation can overcome the obstacles presented by intra-party factionalism. 'Insulated' implementation bodies can facilitate the emergence of the sequencing that can overcome such obstacles.
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