Abstract

Next generation power systems are active networks that handle two-way power flow. They are equipped with extensive communication capabilities to perform dynamic monitoring, protection and control operations. Synchrophasors provide a pseudo real-time representation of grid's current state. Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) placed in different parts of the grid periodically collect synchrophasor data. Then, they send it to a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDCs) through Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS). The entire system formed as PMU Communication Network (PMU-CN) is based on two available frameworks: IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5. As New York Blackout of 2003 showed that accurate and timely delivery of phasor measurements is vital for secure grid operation. Attacks on PMU-CN may lead to several consequences in the grid and cause physical damage. IEEE C37.118.2 does not specify any security mechanism to mitigate security attacks. To address this gap, security mechanism specified in IEC 61850-90-5 have been implemented using OpenSSL library. A novel toolbox called R-GoSV has been developed to construct PMU messages with cybersecurity mechanisms. Thanks to this tool, custom messages have been transmitted in the network to investigate their effectiveness. Finally, the performance evaluation of the specified security algorithms in terms of computational time sis carried out.

Highlights

  • Integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), electric vehicles (EVs) and storage devices into traditional electrical power systems makes it more dynamic and increases its operational complexity

  • Mitigating cybersecurity vulnerabilities is an essential requirement in Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) communication networks

  • It specifies AES-GCM algorithm for encryption of data to protect from accessing by unauthorized party and Hash based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm to achieve message authentication

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), electric vehicles (EVs) and storage devices into traditional electrical power systems makes it more dynamic and increases its operational complexity. IEEE C37.118.2 standard does not specify security requirements to protect data communication over an insecure IP network. Due to involvement of critical infrastructure in synchrophasor based communication, and transmission of data over insecure public network, a strong security mechanism is needed to mitigate cyber-attacks. IEC 61850 is a default standard for substation automation system in a smart grid It offers time critical protocols such as Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sample Value (SV) and information modelling based on logical nodes to achieve interoperability among Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) developed by different vendors within a substation. To achieve compatibility between synchrophasor data transfer based on IEEE C37.118.2 with IEC 61850 substation automation standard, IEC 61850-90-5 was introduced [5] It has additional security features and specifies Hash based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for message authentication.

SYNCHROPHASOR COMMUNICATION
CONCLUSION
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