Implementing decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement in Brazil: is there a place for transparency and participation?

Camila Capucio

doi:10.1590/0034-7329201600108

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss the democracy gap in the implementation process of decisions of the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System in Brazil and possible measures to increase its transparency and accountability. Although the selection of the implementation measure is a sensible political choice that impacts a wide spectrum of different interest groups in diverse manners, government shall give publicity and transparency to the selecting process, making possible for interest groups and agents to present their arguments regarding the possible implementation paths and connecting state governance structures to stakeholders, and allowing the collective and legitimate construction of public interest.

Highlights

It has been observed in the last decades a context of “densification of legality” (LAFER, 1998) in international relations and an increasing institutionalization of international law
International trade, as a field deeply influenced by the globalizing force, has been a very fertile ground for the development of these phenomena, as represented by the constitution and the Capucio evolution of the multilateral trading system – with the passage from GATT 1947 to the WTO – and by the creation of the WTO dispute settlement system, in response to new demands and aspirations arriving from the international society (AMARAL, 2008)
As a unique dispute settlement system, resulting from the evolution of international commercial relations since GATT 1947, WTO dispute settlement does not fit into the classic configuration of international tribunals

Summary

Introduction

It has been observed in the last decades a context of “densification of legality” (LAFER, 1998) in international relations and an increasing institutionalization of international law. There are for example significant differences between the Brazilian legal culture on this subject and the role played by the US Congress in decision-making, consistent with the institutional structure of the definition of foreign trade policies by the US, in which the USTR is included as an agency of the executive branch, but with close ties to the legislative branch (RAMOS, 2010) In this context, it is highlighted the need in the Brazilian system to develop mechanisms for transparency and institutionalized participation of civil society in order to inform the perception of the public agent on the public interest to be pursued (VEIGA, 2007). Different from GATT, WTO includes a thematic diversity in their agreements, which requires a careful balance of multiple interests involved in filling the discretionary space given to members for implementation

Discretionarity and democratic principles enshrined in Brazilian Constitution

Capucio continuação

Conclusion