Abstract

This paper provides a complete characterization of the class of social choice correspondences which are implementable under strong Nash equilibrium. The paper departs from earlier literature on this topic by discarding the use of effectivity functions and uses instead a variant of the game forms used in the context of Nash implementation. It is also shown that the results derived earlier with the use of effectivity functions are implied by the characterization result presented here.

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