Abstract
A social welfare function f assigns to each economic environment p a continuous preorder f(p) on the space of allocations of private goods. f is implementable if for each large finite set Z the correspondence Phi (p) defined by selecting the set of f(p)-maximal allocations in Z is implementable. Then fis implementable only if it satisfies Arrow's independence axiom. Therefore, every implementable social welfare function is constant or dictatorial or inversely dictatorial. If f(p) is merely quasitransitive and f satisfies a basic nonimposition condition then f is oligarchical if it is implementable. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
