Abstract
We propose two simple mechanisms that implement two bargaining sets in super-additive environments. The first bargaining set is a close variation of the one proposed by L. Zhou (1994, Games Econom. Behav.6, 512–526), and the second is the Pareto optimum payoffs of the A. Mas-Colell (1989, J. Math. Econom.18, 129–139) bargaining set. We adopt a simple framework in which the cooperative outcomes are realized as non-cooperative subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies of a two-stage game played by an auxiliary set of individuals competing over the cooperative agents. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72.
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