Implementation of a Memory Disclosure Attack on Memory Deduplication of Virtual Machines

Abstract

Memory deduplication improves the utilization of physical memory by sharing identical blocks of data. Although memory deduplication is most effective when many virtual machines with same operating systems run on a CPU, cross-user memory deduplication is a covert channel and causes serious memory disclosure attack. It reveals the existence of an application or file on another virtual machine. The covert channel is a difference in write access time on deduplicated memory pages that are re-created by Copy-On-Write, but it has some interferences caused by execution environments. This paper indicates that the attack includes implementation issues caused by memory alignment, self-reflection between page cache and heap, and run-time modification (swap-out, anonymous pages, ASLR, preloading mechanism, and self-modification code). However, these problems are avoidable with some techniques. In our experience on KSM (kernel samepage merging) with the KVM virtual machine, the attack could detect the security level of attacked operating systems, find vulnerable applications, and confirm the status of attacked applications.