Abstract
A mechanism which uses neither integer games nor modulo games is shown to implement any social choice function in a production economy with private and (excludable) public goods. More precisely, the socially optimal outcome is the unique undominated Nash equilibrium outcome of a game where each player reports his own preferences and those of two neighbors. This equilibrium also results from the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. There are no equilibria in mixed strategies. Journal of Economic Literature classification number: D 71.
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