Abstract
“King Solomon's Dilemma” is based on a biblical story that can be considered as an allocation problem for an indivisible good among two players. We experimentally compare the performance of the mechanism of Mihara (Japanese Economic Review, 63(3), 420 - 429, 2012) relative to a modified version of his mechanism that we propose. We find that the modified version performs relatively better than Mihara's mechanism in terms of: (1) the proportion of the “first-best” allocations, (2) the proportion of the right-player allocations, (3) “net mean efficiency,” and (4) players’ equilibrium strategies. Moreover, our experimental results suggest that players may find the best strategy in an ascending clock auction before participating in the auction.
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