Imperfect Vaccination Evolutionary Game Incorporating Individual Social Difference and Subjective Perception

Abstract

Previous studies have focused on the assumption that individual attitudes toward epidemics, epidemic-related information, and vaccination are identical with much less effort attempting to consider psychological factors and individual heterogeneity. In this article, we employ a two-layer susceptible–infected–recovered–vaccinated/unaware–aware–unaware (SIRV-UAU) coupled network to depict the interplay between epidemic spreading and information diffusion. We propose an imperfect vaccination evolutionary game model integrating prospect theory (PT) to explore the effect of individual subjective perception and social difference on epidemic spreading and vaccination equilibrium. We find that the individual social difference in the epidemic spreading layer has a more significant impact on the epidemic threshold than that in the information diffusion layer. Individual psychological perception and vaccination behavior decision-making determine the vaccination equilibrium: under the PT, vaccination equilibrium increases with the decrease of the rationality coefficient when the vaccination cost is small. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of social differences on individual vaccination behavior decision-making and find that vaccination equilibrium increases with the increase of social reinforcement strength and primary protective probability. Finally, we discuss the effect of infection cost on vaccination equilibrium when the infection cost of vaccinated individuals is less than that of unvaccinated individuals and observe that a small infection cost helps improve the vaccination equilibrium.