Abstract
In recent years philosophers have given a good deal of attention to imperatives. They have concerned themselves mainly with the logical grammar of sentences of this kind, that is to say their relations to each other and to interrogative and indicative sentences. Very often this topic has been raised in terms of the problem ‘Is imperative inference possible, and if so, what kind of inference is it?’. Many philosophers have contended that there are logically valid inferences that involve imperative sentences. Against this it has been argued that no such inferences are possible. It has even been held that there are no such things as imperatives at all – regarded, that is, as types of expression logically sui generis and independent of indicative sentences.
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