Abstract

The study of political corruption has been beset by disagreements concerning the exact definition of the term. One definition that has grown increasingly popular in the social-scientific literature in recent years is that proposed by Oskar Kurer and developed by Bo Rothstein: political corruption should be understood as a breach of the norm of impartiality. This article argues that while this definition has intuitive plausibility and while its relative parsimony makes it attractive for cross-cultural social-scientific research, it suffers from a number of the ills attending all attempts to depoliticize inherently political concepts. Not only is the definition insufficient to capture numerous instances of the abuse of the public office for private gain, but it is dangerous insofar as it papers over fundamental disagreements about the nature of the good regime. To insist upon this parsimonious definition of corruption is to foreclose a number of essential questions of political philosophy.

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