Abstract
In construction projects, contractors often exhibit opportunistic behaviors, which harms the project performance, and risk allocation between clients and contractors affects the contractors’ opportunistic behaviors (strong and weak). In this study, a structural equation model was built to explore the impacts of risk allocation on opportunistic behavior and the moderating role of trust and control through an empirical test using a recovery questionnaire with 342 interviewees. The results show that the greater the risk contractors take, the stronger their opportunistic behavior is. Trust has a significant inhibitory effect on both strong and weak opportunistic behaviors caused by risk allocation, while control has a significant inhibitory effect only on strong opportunistic behavior caused by risk allocation. This study enriches the research on the governance mechanism and construction management of opportunistic behaviors and provides management suggestions for risk allocation and control measures of such behaviors.
Highlights
In construction projects, clients often face loss caused by contractors’ opportunistic behavior, such as cutting corners and causing delays [1]
This study revealed the impact of risk allocation on opportunistic behavior and explored the moderating effects of trust and control
The findings of 342 samples suggest that excessive risk-taking by contractors reinforces opportunistic behavior
Summary
Clients often face loss caused by contractors’ opportunistic behavior, such as cutting corners and causing delays [1]. In order to reduce the disputes between clients and contractors during the execution of construction projects and restrain contractors’ opportunistic behavior, contracts will clearly stipulate the rights and obligations of the parties and allocate the risks reasonably [2]. Shi et al [4] believed that unreasonable risk allocation would increase the incentive for contractors to adopt opportunistic behaviors. Some scholars believe that such unbalanced risk allocation may lead contractors to cut corners or make changes and claims at a later stage to obtain profits [5]. To restrain the negative relationship between unreasonable risk allocation and contractors’ opportunistic behavior, studies have focused on how to restrain opportunism through reasonable risk allocation. Few scholars have revealed the influence mechanism between risk allocation and opportunistic behavior
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