Abstract

This research investigates the opportunity cost as an indirect cost of financial distress from two perspectives. First, indirect cost is estimated using multi-stage financial distress and non-linear proxy of debt. Second, receivable and inventory management are studied as determinants of indirect cost. The sample includes ongoing Pakistani firms that were healthy in the previous year and documenting positive gross profit. Results showed that firms bear opportunity loss primarily due to leverage rather than multistage financial distress. However, a non-linear relationship is found between leverage and indirect cost. Results further explored the impact of multistage financial distress on internal operations, i.e., working capital policies. It is found that firms manage receivable and inventory simultaneously during the multistage financial distress. Results revealed that increasing receivables and decreasing inventory is suitable during the transition of healthy firms to initial stage of financial distress, i.e., profit reduction. However, decreasing receivables, along with holding more inventory, is recommended for healthy firms that face liquidity problems subsequently. It is concluded that managers can reduce the indirect cost after deploying the optimal debt ratio and recommended receivable and inventory management policies.

Highlights

  • In the last 40 years, modern finance theory has provided a number of models to explain why companies choose to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity

  • When Good Things Turn Bad winning acquirer more typically a single or serial acquirer? This study examines, for the first time, whether M&A deals by serial acquirers are received more favourably by the market than those of single acquirers in G-7 countries using a large sample of 23,852 deals

  • I investigate the impact of acquirer bidding experience on acquirer returns using both the event study method and cross-sectional regressions to test the hypotheses stated in the previous section

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Summary

Introduction

In the last 40 years, modern finance theory has provided a number of models to explain why companies choose to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity. Acquiring companies may wish to increase market power by eliminating potential competition, or it may reflect efforts to improve corporate efficiency or a reaction to deregulation. Empirical research on the topic has demonstrated that various types of merger activity can be attributed to all these goals, though certain theories seem to correspond more than others to particular time periods. A merger is one of the most significant and expensive transactions an individual corporation can undertake, and at an aggregate level, M&As constitute an important means through which resources are distributed both across industries and within a single sector. It has been noted that mergers are influential in propagating technological change (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2002)

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