Abstract
The way cooperation organizes dynamically strongly depends on the topology of the underlying interaction network. We study this dependence using heterogeneous scale-free networks with different levels of (a) degree-degree correlations and (b) enhanced clustering, where the number of neighbors of connected nodes are correlated and the number of closed triangles are enhanced, respectively. Using these networks, we analyze a finite population analog of the evolutionary replicator dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma, the latter being a two-player game with two strategies, defection and cooperation, whose payoff matrix favors defection. Both topological features significantly change the dynamics with respect to the one observed for fully randomized scale-free networks and can strongly facilitate cooperation even for a large temptation to defect, and should hence be considered as important factors in the evolution and sustainment of cooperation.
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