Impact of tax difference and asset structure on a capital-constrained vertical equity holding transnational supply chain

Abstract

Capital and taxes play vital roles in transnational supply chain financing and operations. We use the Stackelberg game method to explore the financing strategy selection and contract clauses setting for a capital-constrained transnational supply chain with vertical equity holding. The results prove that asset structure, tax difference, and shareholding ratio are essential in selecting the financing strategy and additional clause. First, a higher supplier's asset structure can increase the profits of supply chain members. Second, a threshold for contract choice connected to tax difference is discovered. Early payment with a discount clause is optimal when tax difference is significant. When the tax difference is slight, buyer financing without additional clauses is optimal. Further, there exists an optimal shareholding ratio related to tax, which can avoid double marginalisation under buyer financing and reduce supply chain losses under bank financing. Tax subsidies due to deficit make supply chain performance outstrip centralised decision-making when the shareholding ratio is more excellent than a threshold. Last, the choice of strategy under buyer financing is related to the ex-ante or ex-post signing of the purchase contract and the limited deduction of interest payment within the tax law. Our findings guide transnational supply chain financing and operations.