Abstract
This paper establishes a three-stage mixed monopoly model, and deeply discusses the impact of the shareholding reform on environmental tax rate or reward and subsidy intensity, green research and development level, environmental damage and social welfare under the two policies of collecting environmental tax and issuing incentive subsidy funds, and analyses the effect of the two policies. The results show that when implementing the environmental tax policy, the low degree of privatisation of state-owned enterprises will cause less damage to the environment and social welfare; when implementing the reward and subsidy policy, the higher degree of privatisation will cause less damage to the environment and social welfare. Comparing the effects of the two policies, it is better to implement the reward and subsidy fund policy when the privatisation degree of state-owned enterprises is relatively high. If the privatisation degree is not high, the policy choice is related to the social goals expected by the government.
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