Abstract

This study aims to examine the impact of banks’ risk governance (RG) on Egyptian listed banks’ performance and capital requirements as prescribed in Basel regulations. Secondary data from annual reports of all twelve banks listed on the Egyptian Stock Market (EGX) over eleven years (2010–2020) are analyzed using the dynamic ordinary least squares method; where the RG framework is presented by the proxy of the presence of chief risk officer (CRO), risk committee (RC), and audit committee (AC) characteristics. Secondary data from annual reports of all twelve banks listed on the EGX over eleven years are analyzed using the dynamic ordinary least squares method. The results support the role of banks’ RG in improving banks’ both market-based and accounting-based performance. These findings support the importance of having an independent risk committee and a powerful CRO because they can regulate banks’ increasing risk and acquire the advantages of capital requirements by investing assets in more profitable ways with low risk. This paper is one of the few empirical attempts in emerging economics to link bank RG, risk-taking behavior, performance, and capital adequacy ratio (CAR) as defined by Basel III.

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