Abstract

This paper investigates a single-period two-echelon supply chain with random demand, where the loss-averse preference is adopted to describe the retailer's decision-making behavior. By combining the revenue sharing (RS) contract and the buy-back (BB) contract, a new combined contract is introduced. It is shown that the combined contract could mitigate the risk-aversion effect, and coordinate the supply chain. Moreover, the effects of retailer's risk preference on agents' decision-making and profit allocation are studied. In terms of coordination and profit allocation, the combined contract presents more advantages than the RS contract and the BB contract. The numerical experiments are conducted to validate our theoretical results.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.