Abstract

We formulate the interaction between link connectivity and hostile interference in a wireless system as a nonzero-sum two-player game. One player is the transmitter aiming to maintain the connections to its receivers, whereas the other player is the interferer aiming to disrupt the connections. The players’ strategies are their transmitted power levels. We focus on the case in which the ratio of the averages of the channel power gains for the transmitter and interferer are the same at all receivers. We then provide closed-form expressions for the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. When the channel is affected by Rayleigh fading, we show that both players have the same power cost at Nash equilibria. In addition, the Stackelberg strategies dominate the Nash strategies, that is, the utility functions of the Stackelberg equilibria exceed or equal those of the Nash equilibria.

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