Abstract
Dual-credit policy promotes new-energy vehicle (NEV) automakers to invest in technology R & D by granting NEV with better technological performance to higher NEV-credit. Based on the complex network evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a technology R & D diffusion model of automakers considering the technology spillover effects, and explores the dynamic impact of adjusting different dual-credit policy parameters on technology R & D diffusion among automakers. Our results show that: (1) increasing the annual increment of NEV-credit requirement ratio can encourage more NEV automakers to invest in technology R & D, but also lead to significant increase in NEV-credit price. (2) Reducing the CAFE target coefficient can simultaneously promote the diffusion of NEV technology R & D and GV green-technology R & D, but excessive reduction can hinder GV automakers from entering NEV market. (3) Lowering the upper limit of credit per unit NEV suppresses the diffusion of NEV technology R & D. (4) Reducing technology-spillover is conducive to the incentive of dual-credit policy on the diffusion of technology R & D.
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