Impact of customer portrait information superiority on competitive pricing of EV fast-charging stations

Abstract

The rapid development of electric vehicles (EVs) has increased the demand for public fast-charging stations (FCSs). Multiple self-interested charging service operators (CSOs) in an urban transportation network compete with each other through pricing signals to maximize their respective profits, where the information about customer demands and heterogeneous preferences work as important decision criteria. With the prevailing data transaction, the information superiority differences between CSOs may significantly affect the competitive pattern in the charging market. In this study, a Nash-Stackelberg-Nash game framework is established to investigate the strategic pricing of CSOs under different information distribution scenarios. The customer response pattern, namely, the routing and charging choices of EV drivers to pricing signals, is described via a computationally efficient extended stochastic user equilibrium model comprehensively considering heterogeneous customer preferences and decision stochasticity. Then, aiming at different data forms, both parameter-driven and sample-driven CSO pricing models are proposed. The pricing models are reformulated as a tractable single-level mixed-integer linear program, and the game equilibrium is solved alternately via Gauss-Seidel iteration. Numerical simulations are conducted to analyze the impact of single CSO information superiority and double CSO information distribution on CSO profitability and customer experience in both data forms. The influences of endogenous factors like CSO data amount and processing ability, as well as exogenous scenario parameters like customer preference distribution and perception error distribution, are discussed.