Immunizing public key cryptosystems against chosen ciphertext attacks

Abstract

Three methods for strengthening public key cryptosystems in such a way that they become secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks are presented. In an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack, an attacker can query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertext except for the exact object ciphertext to be cryptanalyzed. The first strengthening method is based on the use of one-way hash functions, the second on the use of universal hash functions, and the third on the use of digital signature schemes. Each method is illustrated by an example of a public key cryptosystem based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in finite fields. Security of the three example cryptosystems is formally proved. Two other issues, namely, applications of the methods to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems and enhancement of information authentication capability to the cryptosystems, are also discussed. >