Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, I argue that there exists a class of immoral beliefs. These beliefs are immoral not for the usual reasons, i.e. because of their tendency to cause harm, their immoral acquisition, or the fact that they involve unjustified moral judgments. Rather, the class of beliefs to which I wish to draw attention includes beliefs that do not even have any moral content, but whose non‐moral content is still morally significant. These beliefs are immoral because holding them constitutes an immoral condition of the belief‐holder. This usually involves a moral failure of the belief‐holder. We may object to such beliefs for all of the usual reasons, but I wish to draw attention to their objectionable content based on the kind of character they represent a person as having.1
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