Abstract
Formal agreements on international economic migration are relatively rare; yet, important cooperation on migration has taken place using bilateral labor migration treaties. This paper details the conditions under which immigrant receiving countries use these treaties and tests the implications of the argument on a new dataset on migration treaties. I argue that immigrant receiving states use treaties primarily when they lack sufficient migrant networks to draw from. When states cannot generate large enough flows of migrants or the right type of migrants to fill open positions in the labor market, they turn to the sending state to help them. The sending state, then, acts as a recruiter, helping to channel labor to the receiving state. This paper increases our understanding of why states sign treaties as well as demonstrating the limits of cooperation in this policy domain.
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