Abstract
This article investigates the impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality on political repression. Conditionality refers to the conditions that borrowing countries must implement before they can receive loans from the IMF. An original contribution is made by analyzing this impact using quantitative techniques for samples of developing countries covering 1980 through 1982. A more comprehensive model of political repression, focusing on political leaders' hypothetical reactions to and perceptions of challenges from society and on the constraints on their ability to react to the challenges, is also developed and tested. This comprehensive model receives the strongest support. The results show that political repression tends to be used as a response to threats from society, especially for leaders who have few resources at their disposal, who are constrained by certain IMF conditions, and who assumed power unconstitutionally. However, the overall evidence regarding the impact of IMF conditionality is mixed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
