Abstract
Abstract With advances in automated and connected driving, secure communication is increasingly becoming a safety-critical function. Injection of manipulated radio messages into traffic can cause severe accidents in the foreseeable future, and can currently be achieved without having to manipulate on-board vehicle systems directly, for example by hijacking cellphones instead and using these as senders. Thereby, large-scale attacks on vehicles can be executed remotely, and target relatively vulnerable devices. To mitigate remaining vulnerabilities in current automotive security architectures, this paper proposes a secondary communication channel using vehicle head and taillights. In contrast to existing approaches, this method allows both to achieve a sufficient data rate and to extract the angular position of the sender, by means of an imaging process which only requires close-to-market, cost-efficient technology. Through this, injecting false messages by masquerading as a different sender is considerably more challenging: The receiver can verify a message’s source position with the supposed position of the sender, e.g. by using on-board sensors or communicated information. Thereby, reliably faking both the communicated messages and the position of the sender will require direct manipulation of on-board vehicle systems, raising the security level of the function accordingly, and precluding low-threshold, wide-range attacks.
Highlights
Introduction and motivationWith increasing levels of automated driving, connected driving functions are gaining importance and complexity: Connected updates of navigation maps, traffic jams and road hazard warnings are already established applications
We describe the working principles of a system, originally introduced by Ziehn et al [35], which supplements current radio-based vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication by a secondary channel using visible light communication (VLC); the modulation of humanly invisible authentication messages onto LED head and taillights
The risk for attacks on connected driving is increased by the possibility to send V2X-compatible radio signals from a wide range of devices, including cellphones, whereas the receiver must rely on the message contents to identify the sender, as V2X radio signals are generally undirected
Summary
With increasing levels of automated driving, connected driving functions are gaining importance and complexity: Connected updates of navigation maps, traffic jams and road hazard warnings are already established applications. While the data rate, which is even under favorable conditions limited to the kilohertz domain (cf Section 2.3), is far lower than radio-based communication, it provides a significant increase in cybersecurity, by allowing to accurately localize the source of the signal, and to uniquely authenticate the sender. This is achieved by exploiting the “rolling shutter effect” in CMOS sensors, which enables the proposed imaging transmission of information: Message data and sender. Ziehn et al.: Imaging V2V using visible light position are received simultaneously in a single measurement within a low-cost system
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