Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical Belief

Jonathan Egeland

doi:10.1017/epi.2019.22

Abstract

AbstractA standard view in the epistemology of imagination is that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and perhaps counterfactual conditionals too), or no justification at all. However, in a couple of recent articles, Kind (2016; Forthcoming) argues that imaginings can justify empirical belief about what the world actually is like. In this article, I respond to her argument, showing that imagination doesn't provide the right sort of information to justify empirical belief. Nevertheless, it can help us take advantage of justification that we already have, thereby enabling us to form new doxastically justified beliefs. More specifically, according to the view I advocate, imagination can contribute to one's satisfaction of the proper basing condition – which turns propositional justification into doxastic justification – but without conferring any new justification that the subject isn't already in possession of upon their beliefs. Very little attention has been devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the literature on imagination, and the view I here argue for takes up a yet-to-be occupied position.

Highlights

We sometimes find ourselves engaged in imagination
One important question they’ve asked is: can imaginings teach us anything about the world? A standard answer has become that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible,1 or no justification
Imagination can justify empirical belief, and, in certain cases, the justification it provides is strong enough to turn the justified belief into knowledge

Summary

Introduction

We sometimes find ourselves engaged in imagination. For example, one can imagine that the streets of Rome currently are busy, that Wittgenstein often felt lonely during his stay in his Norwegian hut, or that non-human animals suddenly one day acquire the ability to converse with us humans. One can imagine many things, some of which are true and others which are contrary to fact I will take a closer look at recent attempts by Amy Kind (2016; Forthcoming) to argue against the standard view. As she sees it, imagination can justify empirical belief, and, in certain cases, the justification it provides is strong enough to turn the justified belief into knowledge. I will argue that Kind fails to properly acknowledge the difference between propositional justification and doxastic justification, and, that when one does, it becomes clear that imagination cannot justify empirical belief. Very little attention has been devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the literature on imagination, and the view I here argue for takes up a yet-to-be occupied position

Kind on the epistemic role of imagination

Conclusion