Abstract

While the engagement of Chinese migrants in small-scale mining in Ghana has gained traction in scholarship, the extant literature pays little attention to how the relationship between the so-called formal institutions (e.g., the Minerals Commission and Ministry of Land and Natural Resources) and informal institutions (e.g., the chieftaincy and customary land institutions) enables illegalities in the mining industry. This paper addresses this gap in the literature, focusing on the relationship between formal state and informal customary land institutions in the small-scale mining sector. Using an institutional analytical framework, we argue that the increasing involvement of the Chinese in small-scale mining in Ghana is an expression of a bigger and deep-seated problem characterized largely by uncoordinated interactions between key state and customary institutions. This, we suggest, creates parallel operations of formal and informal systems that promote different levels of agency and maneuvering among actors―breeding uncertainty, bureaucratic logjams, and illegalities in the mining industry. Based on our findings, we recommend that a more efficient coordination between the relevant state and traditional land governing institutions could curb the proliferation of illegal mining activities, and in particular, those involving Chinese migrants. As part of the conclusion, we suggest that future empirical research be conducted to explore the interactions between formal and informal institutions and how they affect mining activities.

Highlights

  • Since the early 2000s, about 50,000 Chinese gold miners have migrated to Ghana to engage in small-scale mining, defined as the exploitation of mineral deposits through the use of rudimentary equipment and involving low levels of production with minimal capital investment, and by law reserved for only Ghanaians [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]

  • We focus on the constitution of Ghana and its accompanying acts on the one hand, and the position of traditional/informal institutions and other stakeholders on the other hand, in relation to how their positions and interactions affect illegal mining

  • Perhaps overlooking a key element of the root cause of illicit small-scale mining in Ghana—which we argue is the disconnect between state and customary institutions—the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which was in opposition in 2013, promised to stop the menace when voted into power

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Summary

Introduction

Since the early 2000s, about 50,000 Chinese gold miners have migrated to Ghana to engage in small-scale mining (locally known as galamsey), defined as the exploitation of mineral deposits through the use of rudimentary equipment and involving low levels of production with minimal capital investment, and by law reserved for only Ghanaians [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. Using an institutional analytical framework, the study demonstrates that state and customary institutional relations are “disjointed” (unintegrated, uncoordinated) as far as regulating the mining sector is concerned This disconnect aids the agency of networked and individual actors—both locals and Chinese migrants—to perpetuate illegal small-scale mining, which has created enormous environmental, political, and economic implications for the mining communities and Ghana as a whole. This claim goes contrary to the predominant views of distinct formal and informal spaces, and the weaknesses of the former being the cause of illicit mining activities [9], but somewhat supports recent scholarship on hybridity [17,18].

China’s Pursuit of Resources in Africa
Theorizing Institutions in Africa
Acquisition of License and Persistent Illegalities
State Response to Illegal Chinese Miners through Inter-Ministerial Task Force
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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