Abstract

This article provides a typology of Russian memory practices in the international sphere and traces them to Russian foreign-policy doctrine. Drawing on primary sources, it argues that Russian uses of history abroad exemplify a growing transnational illiberal memory, in reaction to the liberal teleological formulation of history and reconciliation. The second section examines how the Russian state uses the politics of history within its own foreign policy and public diplomacy, drawing on an original dataset of Russian international memory activities. The findings are grouped into four categories: (1) memory exports, (2) alliances, (3) offense, and (4) defense. Memory exports and alliances inform memory diplomacy and are ways of promoting Russia, using its history as a soft-power resource. Memory offense and defense are practices within memory wars that indicate the geopolitical value placed by the Kremlin on protecting perceived historical resources. However, the findings also demonstrate that Russia does not prioritize the political threat posed by antithetical memory when there is no apparent political will to use the memory to challenge Russian geopolitical ambitions. It concludes that Russian memory engagement is defined by geopolitical competition against the West and then weighted against national security concerns and/or the potential to gain influence.

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