II.—THE MEANING OF PROPER NAMES

Abstract

A PROPER name is a name of a particular thing; and a necessary condition of its being particular is its having a (particular) historical position. The thing named may also be unique in virtue of possessing some characteristic or set of characteristics possessed by nothing else. But it would not be its uniqueness which made it a possible subject of a proper name. For identical particular things may be given different names; and a unique thing may go nameless. Imagine two human twins more alike than any twins ever are: we should yet give them different proper names. And imagine a tree with a unique shape: we might decline to give it a proper name. The tree's uniqueness might interest us sufficiently to cause us to give it a proper name. But the subject of the proper name would not be the tree-as-unique but the tree-as-particular. That about the tree which stimulated us to give it a proper name would not be that about the tree which made it a possible subject of a proper name. What makes it a possible subject for a proper name is that we can find it at a particular time or at a particular time and place. Now certainly most things bearing proper names have location in both time and space, and perhaps all things have both sorts of location. But I do not want to discuss this question here. I want to insist only on the minimal condition of location in time. The views I shall offer will apply equally if the required location of the subject of proper names is of both sorts. I shall comment, but only briefly, on the topic of proper names of such doubtfully spatial entities as divine beings, ghosts, and fictional characters. Special problems are also raised by the proper names of such large and loose entities as nations and institutions. There is also a problem as to the length of temporal duration which a thing must occupy in order to be a possible subject of a proper name. For example, we give proper names to storms which last an appreciable time; do we also think it correct to give a proper name to a very brief event, as an earthquake ? The views I shall defend about the meaning of proper names will apply in either case. The particular question I want to consider is whether the meaning of proper names is denotative or connotative or both. The problem arises as follows. Because the thing named is particular (has a particular temporal location), it might appear that the meaning of the name is denotative -is just this